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Brexit and implications for the free movement of capital 
 
[Accepted/Forthcoming: (2019) 46 Legal Issues of Economic Integration] 
 
Jonathan MUKWIRI* 
 
Abstract 
 
One misleading mantra in the Brexit debate is that the EU’s single market freedoms were 
inseparable.  This article takes a micro-legal research approach in examining the question: 
to what extent would free movement of capital be available to the UK when the UK leaves the 
EU’s single market? The free movement of capital is the only one of the EU’s fundamental 
freedoms that extends beyond Member States to also apply to third countries.  Like other 
fundamental freedoms, it extends beyond equal treatment to require market access.  This 
article argues that free movement of capital would still be available to the UK post-Brexit, as 
all restrictions to free movement of capital are prohibited unless justified under EU law.  It 
argues that as long as the post-Brexit legal context in the UK remains comparable with that 
of the EU, the justifiable derogations to free movement of capital would not apply against the 
UK.  Thus, the mantra that the EU’s single market freedoms were inseparable is misleading. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
To what extent will free movement of capital be available to the UK when the UK leaves the 
EU’s single market?  In the July 2018 White Paper, the UK Government stated: ‘Following 
the decision of the people of the UK in the referendum, the UK is leaving the EU, and as a 
result will leave the Single Market and the Customs Union – seizing new opportunities and 
forging a new role in the world.’1 But the EU leaders have, throughout the Brexit debate, 
insisted that the EU’s single market freedoms are inseparable, and in July 2018 the EU chief 
negotiator Michel Barnier reiterated that ‘we will protect the single market which is based on 
the indivisibility of what we call the four freedoms of movement for people, goods, services 
and capital.’2  The question is whether EU law allows for separation of these freedoms. 
 
This article argues that, unlike other EU freedoms, the free movement of capital applies erga 
omnes, and would therefore apply to the UK post-Brexit.  In EU law, it is trite law that the 
free movement of capital extends to third countries.  As such, when the UK becomes a third 
country, the UK will continue to benefit from free movement of capital.  To the extent that 
EU law extends free movement of capital to third countries without imposing obligations 
upon third countries to subscribe to the other EU freedoms, it is misleading for EU leaders, in 
the Brexit debate, to insist that the EU freedoms are inseparable. 
 
The arguments herein are twofold.  First, that Article 63 TFEU on free movement of capital 
is not exhausted by the prohibition of nationality discrimination but rather by the prohibition 
of all restrictions between Member States and third countries.  Where the Court has used the 
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phrase ‘discrimination’ or ‘unequal treatment’ in cases of free movement of capital, the 
phrase should be read as a shorthand (a quick way of deciding the case without the need to 
apply the non-restrictive test where the outcome would be the same) for assessing hindrance 
to market access in light of prohibition of ‘all restrictions’ under Article 63 TFEU.  After 
Brexit, Member States will not only still be prohibited from discriminating against UK 
nationals, but will also still be prohibited from insulating their national markets as to hinder 
market access.  Second, although in addition to the general derogations under Article 65 
TFEU, applicable to both Member States and third countries, there are four distinct 
restrictions that Member States may apply against third countries, none of these derogations 
are likely to be applied to the UK after Brexit.  For general EU economic market access, 
Brexit creates uncertainties for the UK, but as regards to the free movement of capital 
between Member States and third countries, the jurisprudence of the Court gives a degree of 
certainty to suggest that it is likely to be ‘business as usual’ for the UK post-Brexit. 
 
It is not in the scope of this article to discuss the implications of Brexit in relation to the free 
movement of goods, services, establishment, and persons.  It is confined to the examination 
of the extent that free movement of capital will be available to the UK after Brexit.  This 
examination is confined to the Treaty provisions and EU case law, avoiding speculative 
discussions that may not fully assess the uncertainty of post-Brexit situation.  For Brexit and 
other implications, the reader may refer to other academic works such as the works of Gareth 
Davies writing on ‘free movement of workers;’3 Panos Koutrakos writing on ‘international 
trade treaties;’4 Wolf-Georg Ringe writing on ‘financial market;’5 John Armour writing on 
‘financial services;’6 Simon Deakin writing on ‘labour rights;’7 Niamh Moloney writing on 
‘financial services;’8 and Gareth Davies writing on the question of ‘what does it all mean?’9 
 
The analysis herein proceeds as follows. The second section highlights the mantra by EU 
leaders that the EU freedoms are inseparable.  The third provides a brief context of and key 
features of Article 63 TFEU.  The fourth explores how Article 63 TFEU is not exhausted by 
equal treatment in the market and how the requirements for free movement of capital go 
beyond the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality.  It argues that Article 63 TFEU 
is about market access and prohibits all restrictions whether or not they are non-
discriminatory.  The fifth looks at derogations in Articles 64-66 and 75 which may restrict 
free movement of capital between Member States and third countries and argues that none of 
these derogations are likely to apply to the UK after Brexit.  The sixth offers thoughts on 
post-Brexit scenarios and what the foregoing discussion means.  The final section concludes. 
 
2. EU freedoms and the inseparability mantra 
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When the UK finally leaves the EU, it will become a third country in relation to the EU.  
Having exited the EU, as a third country, the UK will no long have full enjoyment of the EU 
market unless a suitable EU/UK deal is agreed. 
 
Those who campaigned for the UK to leave the EU seemed to want access to the EU market 
without free movement of people – as they desired to ‘take back control’ of immigration.10  
Mr Donald Tusk, the president of the European Council, was quick to announce that ‘access 
to the single market means acceptance of all four freedoms – including free movement of 
people. There will be no single market à la carte.’11  Mr Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of 
the European Commission, also warned that the UK would not be able to have ‘à la carte’ 
access to the EU’s single market if it restricts free movements of persons and goods.12 Mr 
Martin Schulz, the president of the European Parliament, echoing a consensus among EU 
leaders, said that the four freedoms – people, services, goods and capital – were 
inseparable.13  This was echoed by Angela Merkel, the chancellor of Germany, where ‘in a 
speech in Berlin on December 6th she reiterated that Europe’s four freedoms are inseparable 
and inviolable.’14  Starting the Brexit negotiations, Barnier, the EU chief negotiator, said: 
‘These four freedoms are indivisible. This is how our Single Market works. And let me be 
clear: the integrity of the Single Market will never be compromised in these negotiations.’15  
This mantra of inseparability of the EU freedoms ignores EU law in regards to the free 
movement of capital, which extends to third countries without imposing other freedoms, and 
therefore this mantra is misleading. 
 
This inseparability of EU freedoms has become a dogma that has been picked up by the 
press, with the Financial Times stating: ‘Participation in the single market requires 
acceptance of all four EU freedoms: free movement of goods, capital, services and people.’16  
In the July 2018 White Paper, the UK reiterated that leaving the EU the UK would ‘end free 
movement [of people], giving the UK back control over how many people come to live in the 
UK.’17  The micro-legal question can be restated as follows: without free movement of 
people, to what extent would the UK have access to free movement of capital after Brexit? 
 
3. Context and features of Article 63 TFEU 
 
The basic rule in Article 63 TFEU is ‘free movement of capital’ within Member States and 
between Member States and third countries.  Free movement of capital (Art 63 TFEU) is one 
of the fundamental freedoms (Art 26 TFEU) brought into force by the Maastricht Treaty (Art 
73 EC).  The earlier provision on free movement of capital was contained in Article 67 EEC, 
which the Court construed to mean that capital liberalisation was to take place ‘to the extent 
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necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the common market.’18  As by then Article 67 
EEC had not abolished all restrictions to free movement of capital, reinforcement of the 
single market was made by secondary legislation under Directive 88/361,19 which sought to 
abolish all restrictions to free movement of capital.  The Maastricht Treaty substantially 
reproduced the content of Directive 88/361 into Article 73b(1) EC, which was renumbered at 
Amsterdam as Article 56(1) EC, and was later renumbered at Lisbon as Article 63(1) 
TFEU.20 
 
Article 63 TFEU prohibits all restrictions on the movement of capital.  Interpretation of this 
freedom lies with the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’).  The Council or 
Commission still plays a role: Article 65(4) allows the Council or Commission to rule on the 
legality of restrictive tax measures that a Member State has imposed on third countries.  As 
discussed below, the potential for this and other derogations limiting free movement to or 
from the UK after Brexit is unlikely. 
 
In referring to the free movement of capital, the TFEU does not define ‘capital.’  The Court’s 
case law on free movement of capital, after decades of a shadowy existence, has experienced 
rapid development in recent years,21 and in its developed case law, the Court has ruled that 
what amounts to movement of capital is not literally filling a car with money and moving it 
across the border.22  ‘Although the Treaty does not define the terms movements of capital and 
payments, it is settled case-law that Directive 88/361, together with the nomenclature 
annexed to it, may be used for the purposes of defining what constitutes a capital 
movement.’23  According to Directive 88/361, capital movement include: direct investments; 
investments in real estate; operations in securities normally dealt in on the capital market; 
operations in units of collective investment undertakings; operations in securities and other 
instruments normally dealt in on the money market; operations in current and deposit 
accounts with financial institutions; credits related to commercial transactions or to the 
provision of services in which a resident is participating; other operations with financial 
institutions, including personal capital operations such as dowries, legacies, and endowments. 
 
The Court has also stated that the list annexed to Directive 88/361 is not an exhaustive list of 
what amounts to ‘capital’ movements.24  Movements of capital for the purpose of Article 
63(1) TFEU thus include, in particular, investments in the form of a shareholding which 
confers the possibility of effective participation in the management and control of an 
undertaking (‘direct’ investment) and the acquisition of shares on the capital market solely 
with the intention of making a financial investment without any intention of influencing its 
management and control (‘portfolio investments’).25  Thus, the application of Article 63 
TFEU is broad enough to cover all kinds of investments by both natural and legal persons, 
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and includes shares or any form of share capital.26  It is here argued that the UK, post-Brexit, 
would continue to access this broad context and application of the free movement of capital. 
 
We turn to the features of the free movement of capital.  Below is discussed the three features 
of the rule on free movement of capital.  After Brexit, these three features would apply 
regardless of the status the UK holds in relation to the EU.  It should be borne in mind that 
unless derogations apply, the scope of Article 63 TFEU covers third countries regardless of 
the status a third country holds in relation to the EU.  This wide scope of Article 63 TFEU 
was meant to ‘signal Europe’s firm commitment to an open investment environment to the 
world and was based on the conviction that a free inflow of capital would benefit the EU area 
even if granted unilaterally.’27  This wide scope of capital movement suggests that the EU is a 
‘market.’  ‘If the EU is really a market with frills, then Brexit is not such a big deal.’28  A 
closer analysis of EU case law reveals that the below three features of Article 63 TFEU 
would apply post-Brexit regardless of the UK’s status in relation to the EU. 
 
First, Article 63 TFEU frees the movement of capital between a Member State and another 
Member State, and between a Member State and a third country.29 One of the effects of 
prohibiting third country restrictions is to protect market participants against sudden single-
handed attempts by Member States to revert to protectionist ideas.30  After Brexit, this wider 
freedom would continue to pose challenges for Member States who may wish to protect their 
national economic interests against the UK.  Even before Brexit, there has been a growing 
national protectionism hampering the free market.31 
 
Second, the rule in Article 63 TFEU is directly effective.32  In Skatteverket v A, the Court said 
that Article 63(1) TFEU ‘lays down a clear and unconditional prohibition for which no 
implementing measure is needed and which confers rights on individuals which they can rely 
on before the courts.’33  The question is: would a UK company, after Brexit, be able to rely 
on Article 63 TFEU directly?  In Fidium Finanz AG, the Court said, ‘contrary to the chapter 
of the Treaty concerning the free movement of capital, the chapter regulating the freedom to 
provide services does not contain any provision which enables service providers in non-
member countries and established outside the European Union to rely on those provisions.’34  
The use of the phrase ‘contrary to’ denotes an exception – ‘unlike’ free movement of capital, 
freedom of services cannot be relied on by third countries.  In Skatteverket v A, the Court put 
it in the following terms: ‘as regards the movement of capital between Member and non-
member States, Article 56(1) EC, in conjunction with Articles 57 EC and 58 EC, may be 
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relied on before national courts and may render national rules that are inconsistent with it 
inapplicable, irrespective of the category of capital movement in question.’  The Court said 
that Article 63 TFEU applies ‘the same terms for movements of capital taking place within 
the [EU] and those relating to relations with third countries.’35  Thus, after Brexit, a UK 
company would rely on Article 63 TFEU directly as would a Member State company. 
 
Third, Article 63 TFEU prohibits all restrictions to capital movement and therefore goes 
beyond unequal treatment.36  A national measure is subject to Article 63(1) TFEU, even 
though the rules in issue may not give rise to unequal treatment, if they are capable of 
impeding cross-border capital movement and dissuading investors from investing.37  It is also 
worth noting that in the context of free movement of capital, no distinction is drawn between 
import and export of capital.38  The prohibition in Article 63 TFEU applies ‘irrespective of 
the category of capital movement in question,’39 – which would encompass capital to or from 
the UK after Brexit.  As such, unless justified under Articles 64, 65, 66 and 75 TFEU, Article 
63 TFEU prohibits all restrictions to all capital flows in and out of the EU. 
 
4. Is Article 63 about Equal Treatment or Market Access? 
 
After Brexit, if, for example, a Member State were to have rules restricting free movement of 
capital, but rules that apply equally to that Member State’s nationals and to UK nationals, 
such rules would still infringe Article 63 TFEU, for the Article is about market access, and 
prohibits all restrictions whether or not they are non-discriminatory. 
 
Non-restrictive model as the primary test for assessing breach of Article 63 TFEU 
 
It has been rightly argued by Steffen Hindelang that Article 63 TFEU guarantees access to 
the market, assured by the prohibition of hindrance.40  The prohibition of hindrance is what is 
referred to herein as the ‘non-restrictive’ model of assessing breach of Article 63 TFEU.  The 
Court has described free movement of capital as a fundamental freedom of the EU Treaty.41  
The Court regards EU treaties as having the effect of limiting Member States’ ‘sovereign 
rights’ and creating ‘a body of law which binds’ Member States and ‘their nationals.’42  The 
interpretation of the Court in regard to Article 63 TFEU is binding on Member States.  The 
Court applies a non-restrictive interpretation to Article 63 TFEU to guarantee market access. 
 
As to whether Article 63 TFEU is primarily about market access and not per se about equal 
treatment, the Court has made it clear in a number of decisions that breach of Article 63 
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TFEU does not per se depend on discrimination.43  Article 63 TFEU prohibits not only 
discriminatory or particularly restrictive treatment of nationals of other Member States, but 
every restriction of cross-border transfer of capital.44  For this reason, the requirement of the 
free movement of capital is infringed if the measure applies equally but dissuades investors 
from other Member States.45  Thus, to guarantee market access, the Court applies the non-
restrictive interpretation in finding whether there is a breach of Article 63 TFEU. 
 
Moreover, in applying a non-restrictive interpretation to Article 63 TFEU, in seeking to 
ensure that market access is not hindered, a restriction to free movement of capital need not 
be substantial.  In the non-restrictive interpretation of Article 63 TFEU, it suffices that a 
Member State imposes a measure that ‘dissuades investors in other Member States from 
investing,’ and it is irrelevant that the measure does ‘not give rise to unequal treatment.’46 
 
Taking a non-restrictive approach to the interpretation of Article 63 TFEU, the Court does 
not necessarily require evidence of discrimination or unequal treatment, but rather that there 
is hindrance to market access. To appreciate the non-restrictive approach, a few of these 
cases are examined briefly here below. 
 
In two golden share cases, Commission v Spain47 and Commission v United Kingdom,48 the 
Court found that the golden share arrangements applicable to the undertakings in Spanish 
companies (Repsol, Telefónica, Argentaria, Tabacalera, Endesa) and a British company 
(British Airports Authority) were a hindrance to market access and therefore breached Article 
63(1) TFEU.  In the Spanish companies, the golden share meant that the State had the power 
to restrict and approve certain decisions, including mergers or change of corporate objects or 
the disposal of certain assets or shareholdings in those companies.  In the British company, 
the golden shares created power for the State to restrict and approve certain decisions, 
including the disposal of an airport and the acquisition of more than 15 per cent of the voting 
shares in a company.  The court found that the measures ‘affect the position of a person 
acquiring a shareholding as such and are thus liable to deter investors from other Member 
States from making such investments and, consequently, affect access to the market.’49 
 
In Commission v Portugal, the Court having said that the prohibition in Article 63 TFEU 
‘goes beyond the mere elimination of unequal treatment’ sought to clarify the non-restrictive 
requirement of Article 63 TFEU.  According to the Court, the breach of Article 63 TFEU 
does not depend merely on unequal treatment and therefore is not exhausted by equal 
treatment.  Even though the rules in issue may not give rise to unequal treatment, if 
nonetheless they are liable to impede the acquisition of shares in the undertakings concerned 
and to dissuade investors in other Member States from investing in the capital of those 
undertakings, they are therefore liable, as a result, to render the free movement of capital 
illusory.50  In Commission v Portugal, although the measures did not involve any unequal 
                                               
43 See Cases C-367/98, Commission v Portugal, paras 44-45; C-174/04 Commission v Italy, EU:C:2005:350, 
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treatment, the fact that they were liable to ‘dissuade investors in other Member States from 
investing in the capital of those undertakings,’ was enough to breach Article 63 TFEU.  
Similarly, in Festersen, the Court found that the Danish rule on acquiring property for 
agricultural purpose, imposing certain conditions, while not discriminating between Danish 
nationals and nationals of other Member States, the rule was nevertheless restricting the free 
movement of capital contrary to the Treaty.51  As such, any measure, regardless of its 
discriminatory nature or equality, which renders ‘the free movement of capital illusory,’ 
breaches Article 63 TFEU. 
 
In some cases where the issue is clearly on discrimination, where a national provision creates 
discrimination, the Court tends to use the language that applies the non-restrictive test.  Few 
examples will suffice. In Verkooijen, the issue was clearly on discrimination, yet the Court 
used the language that applied the non-restrictive test instead of the non-discrimination test. 
The Court in Verkooijen applied the non-restrictive test in finding that the discriminatory 
national provision ‘constitutes a restriction of capital movements’ and ‘has the effect of 
dissuading nationals of a Member State residing in the Netherlands from investing their 
capital in companies which have their seat in another Member State.’52 
 
In Bordessa, the national provision discriminated against exporters of certain capital based on 
the country of destination, requiring that a person leaving national territory bearing coins, 
banknotes or bearer cheques make a prior declaration and obtain prior administrative 
authorisation if the amount exceeded a certain amount.  Prior authorisation was not 
acceptable as it would make capital movement subject to the discretion of administrative 
authorities.  Applying the non-restrictive test in Bordessa, the Court found the discriminatory 
Spanish rules in breach of Article 63 TFEU where the rules caused ‘the exercise of the free 
movement of capital to be subject to the discretion of the administrative authorities and thus 
be such as to render that freedom illusory’ and the rules had ‘the effect of impeding capital 
movements.’53 
 
In Trummer, the issue was clearly on discrimination, where a national provision required 
recourse to the national currency for the purposes of creating a mortgage, yet that Court 
applied the non-restrictive test instead of the non-discrimination test.  Applying the non-
restrictive test in Trummer and Mayer, the Court found the Austrian rule in breach of Article 
63 TFEU where the effect of the rule was ‘liable to dissuade the parties concerned from 
denominating a debt in the currency of another Member State, and may thus deprive them of 
a right which constitutes a component element of the free movement of capital and 
payments.’54 
 
In Svensson and Gustafsson, the Court found the Luxembourg rule in breach of Article 63 
TFEU simply because it was ‘liable to dissuade those concerned from approaching banks 
established in another Member State and therefore constitute an obstacle to movements of 
capital such as bank loans.’55 
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Understanding the jurisprudence of the Court – the non-restrictive approach to Article 63 
TFEU – gives a degree of certainty to conclude that after Brexit, the UK, as a third country, 
would continue to enjoy the benefits of the free movement of capital.  The Court uses phrases 
such as to ‘render that freedom illusory’ and ‘liable to dissuade’ investors, to assess 
restrictions that breach Article 63 TFEU.  Understanding the non-restrictive approach to 
Article 63 TFEU alleviates any fear that capital to or from a post-Brexit UK would be 
indirectly restricted by cleverly crafted rules by any Member State.  This approach would 
also allow the UK to have ‘à la carte’ access to the EU’s single market in regards to capital. 
 
Non-discrimination model as short-hand for assessing breach Article 63 TFEU 
 
It has been argued in the literature that Article 63 TFEU guarantees equal treatment in the 
market, enforced by the prohibition of discrimination.56  This is what is referred to herein as 
the ‘non-discrimination’ model of assessing breach of Article 63 TFEU.  In most of the cases 
where there is discrimination, there is likely to be a breach of Article 63 TFEU.  But the 
analysis of the non-discrimination model is difficult to defend, as it either violates the non-
restriction model by justifying a restriction if it is not ‘substantial’ or adopts the approach 
sometimes taken by the court in relation to other freedoms.57  It is therefore here argued that 
the non-discrimination model is only applicable in so far as it hinders market access, for 
Article 63 TFEU is not primarily concerned with equal treatment but market access. 
 
For sure there are cases that may seem to apply a non-discrimination model to free movement 
of capital, but these are rather shorthand measures of dispensing the cases before the Court 
without the need to emphasise that Article 63 TFEU is not exhausted by equal treatment.  In 
Konle v Republik Osterreich,58 the Court found that the Austrian law that exempted Austrian 
nationals from having to obtain authorisation before acquiring a plot of land which is built 
on, but required other nationals to obtain authorisation, created a discriminatory restriction 
against nationals of other Member States in respect of capital movements between Member 
States, and that such discrimination was prohibited by Article 63 TFEU.  It is argued that the 
Court used non-discrimination as shorthand for dispensing of the issue, as the Court found it 
not necessary to explain the principle that Article 63 TFEU is not exhausted by equal 
treatment. 
 
A good example that demonstrates the Court’s use of non-discrimination as shorthand for 
dispensing the issues is Commission v Portugal.59  First, the Portuguese government 
conceded that its prohibition precluding investors from other Member States from acquiring 
more than a given number of shares in certain Portuguese undertakings involved unequal 
treatment of nationals of other Member States and restricted the free movement of capital.  
But the Portuguese government argued that its administrative policy was not to use the 
powers conferred on it by the provisions in issue.  The Court, applying a shorthand approach, 
did not at first attempt to correct the Portuguese government that Article 63 TFEU goes 
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beyond unequal treatment.  The Court was only concerned that the administrative practices of 
not enforcing the provisions in issue, ‘which by their nature are alterable at will by the 
authorities and are not given appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the 
proper fulfillment of a Member State’s obligations under the Treaty.’  Second, the Portuguese 
government argued that their rules, requiring authorization for the acquisition of a holding in 
certain Portuguese undertakings in excess of a specified level, though in principle contrary to 
free movement of capital, were non-discriminatory, applying without distinction to national 
shareholders and to shareholders who are nationals of other Member States.  Lest the 
Portuguese government misunderstand that Article 63 TFEU is exhausted by equal treatment, 
the Court disagreed, stating that the general prohibition on restrictions on the movement of 
capital in Article 63 TFEU ‘goes beyond the mere elimination of unequal treatment, on 
grounds of nationality, as between operators on the financial markets.’ 
 
Article 63 TFEU prohibits not only discriminatory treatment of nationals of other Member 
States, but also every restriction of cross-border transfer of capital.60  In the assessment of 
Article 63 TFEU, any reference to discrimination or unequal treatment in the cases is only a 
shorthand tool to aid the assessment of the extent the measure in issue is liable to prevent or 
substantially restrict market access.  The Court tends to treat any discrimination or unequal 
treatment as ‘a restriction on the free movement of capital which is, in principle, prohibited 
by Article’ 63(1) TFEU.61  Where the phrase ‘discrimination’ or ‘unequal treatment’ is 
encountered in free movement of capital cases, it should be read in light of Article 63 TFEU 
prohibition of ‘all restrictions’ and therefore treated as a shorthand tool for measuring 
hindrance to market access.  As such, discrimination or unequal treatment is not in itself an 
exhaustive yardstick for finding a breach of Article 63 TFEU.  After Brexit, any Member 
State that may wish to insulate its local capital market against UK nationals by legislating 
non-discrimination rules that restrict capital movement would be in breach of Article 63 
TFEU. 
 
5. Justifying restrictions to free movement of capital 
 
Justification of overriding general interest and derogation under Article 65(1)(c) TFEU 
 
Notwithstanding that Article 63 TFEU prohibits all restrictions to free movement of capital, 
Member States may restrict free movement of capital if their national measures are justified 
in the Treaty or if there is justifiable overriding general interest.62 As to the latter exception of 
overriding general interest, it suffices here to mention one example.  In Commission v the 
Netherlands, the Court said ‘that the guarantee of a service of general interest, such as 
universal postal service, may constitute an overriding reason in the general interest capable of 
justifying an obstacle to the free movement of capital.’63 Justification of overriding general 
interest is not third country specific, but apply to both intra-EU and third countries.  Given its 
general applicability, this exception is arguably unlikely to make any difference post-Brexit. 
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Case law justifying restriction of capital is less extensive.  One explanation why there is less 
extensive case law on justifications in the field of capital than in respect of other freedoms is 
because of the fact that the derogations embrace some aspect of the public-interest 
requirements found elsewhere.64  The Court will determine whether a given national 
legislation gives rise to an overriding reason to justify a restriction to free movement of 
capital and therefore not to be construed as arbitrary discrimination.  For a national 
legislation to be justified, the difference in treatment must not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain the objective of the legislation.65  According to the Court’s settled case law, 
aims of a purely economic nature cannot constitute an overriding reason in the general 
interest justifying a restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty.66 
 
In principle, Article 65(1)(c) TFEU allows Member States to take measures which are 
justified on grounds of public policy or public security.  However, it should be stated that this 
derogation in Article 65 TFEU is not easy to justifiably invoke.  In Commission v Portugal,67 
the Court decided that a restriction to free movement of capital can be justified if (a) 
overriding requirements of general interest apply; or (b) express derogations in Article 65 
TFEU apply, and the measure accords with the principle of proportionality.  Public policy or 
security exceptions are difficult to invoke when a Member State wishes to restrict free 
movement of capital.  The Court interprets these derogations very strictly.68  Often, however, 
national activities are ostensibly aimed at national economic protectionism.  The Court has, 
however, ruled that these derogations cannot be applied to serve purely economic ends.69  In 
Commission v Portugal the court said that ‘economic grounds can never serve as justification 
for obstacles prohibited by the Treaty.’70  Invoking public policy or security, a Member State 
would find it difficult to successfully raise justification for breach of Article 63 TFEU. 
 
Further, a post-Brexit UK would draw comfort from the understanding that the application of 
public policy and public security derogations in Article 65(1)(c) TFEU to justify restriction of 
the movement of capital to or from third countries, are subject to a number of limitations.  In 
Eglise de scientologie v The Prime Minister,71 the Court outlined five limitations.  First, 
‘derogations from the fundamental principle of free movement of capital, be interpreted 
strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without 
any control by the EU institutions.’  Second, ‘those derogations must not be misapplied so as, 
in fact, to serve purely economic ends.’  Third, ‘any person affected by a restrictive measure 
based on such a derogation must have access to legal redress.’  Fourth, measures applied 
must be proportionate – ‘justified only if they are necessary for the protection of the interests 
which they are intended to guarantee and only in so far as those objectives cannot be attained 
by less restrictive measures.’  Fifth, the derogations are subject to the principle of legal 
certainty – the measure applied should ‘enable individuals to be apprised of the extent of their 
rights and obligations deriving from Article [63] of the Treaty.’  The jurisprudence on capital 
requires that the national measure allow potential investors, purchasers or other persons 
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invoking this freedom to be clear when a particular form of restriction will be applied.72  In 
the inapplicability of these derogations, it is here argued that the UK would have ‘à la carte’ 
access to the EU’s single market in regards to the free movement of capital. 
 
Justification on national taxation grounds under Article 65(1)(a)-(b) TFEU 
 
In some cases, where there is a restriction, the Court has not found breach of Article 63 
TFEU because the restriction fell within a legitimate exercise of national sovereignty or was 
not truly a restriction.  For example, in Kerckhaert-Morres v Belgium,73 the Court found that 
the restriction and adverse double taxation that applied equally was a result of justified 
exercise of Member States’ fiscal sovereignty.  In other words, as opined by Advocate 
General Geelhoed, a distinction is drawn between ‘quasi restrictions’ and ‘true restrictions,’ 
and the ‘quasi restrictions’ in the taxation systems should be treated as falling outside Article 
63 TFEU.74  The ‘quasi restriction’ approach in the area of taxation was recognised by the 
Court in Block v Finanzamt Kaufbeuren,75 where the Court said that it is settled case-law that 
the Treaty offers no guarantee for neutral taxation, and that the disparities in the tax 
legislation of the Member States may often produce advantages or disadvantages for EU 
citizens.76 
 
One general restriction that may continue to apply to the UK is on taxation, but as it applies 
to both Intra-EU and Extra-EU capital movements, it would make no difference to the UK 
post-Brexit.  Taxation remains the main field where Member States may continue restricting 
free movement of capital.  Article 65(1)(a) allows Member States ‘to apply the relevant 
provisions of their tax law which distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same 
situation with regard to their place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital 
is invested.’  Article 65(1)(b) allows Member States ‘to take all requisite measures to prevent 
infringements of national law and regulations, in particular in the field of taxation and the 
prudential supervision of financial institutions.’  Accordingly, national legislation may 
justifiably distinguish between resident and non-resident taxpayers.  However, unequal 
treatment permitted under Article 65(1)(a) TFEU must be distinguished from arbitrary 
discrimination, which is prohibited under Article 65(3) TFEU.77  In general, it seems that the 
Treaty here gave Member States all that they wanted, ‘both free movement of capital and 
national tax autonomy.’78 
 
It could be argued that the Court remains lenient on upholding restrictions based on national 
taxation.  The case of Kerckhaert demonstrates the leniency the Court takes on taxation.79  
This argument is well made by Jukka Snell,80 who states that ‘the judgment in Kerckhaert 
was a clear statement of principle.  International double taxation is not contrary to the Treaty 
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free movement rules.’  Taxation remains an area not fully in harmony with free movement 
due to the autonomy Member States hold in matters of national tax.  While in other areas 
barriers are easily found to be in breach of Article 63 TFEU, Snell observes that, ‘in the field 
of tax barriers a different approach now prevails, despite the fact that double taxation is the 
most serious obstacle there can be to people and their capital crossing internal borders.’81  
The Court in the field of double regulation does not take this leniency seen in taxation.  The 
result of Kerckhaert, Snell concludes, is that ‘the Court is prepared to accommodate Member 
States in the field of taxation to a far greater degree than in the field of regulation.’ 
 
In a third country where the legal context is not comparable to that of the EU, the Court is 
willing to interpret the Treaty derogations against third country more generously in favour of 
restriction of free movement of capital.  In FII Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, the Court said that ‘it may be that a Member State will be able to demonstrate that a 
restriction on capital movement to or from non-member countries is justified for a particular 
reason in circumstances where that reason would not constitute a valid justification for a 
restriction on capital movements between Member States.’82  As long as the legal context in 
the UK remains comparable to that of the EU, Member States may not justify restricting 
capital movement to or from the UK post-Brexit.  The rebuttable presumption for allowing 
restrictions is that: ‘movements of capital to or from third countries take place in a different 
legal context from that which occurs within the’ EU, such that the differing legal context 
does not ‘ensure cooperation between national tax authorities,’ which leads to the conclusion 
that ‘the taxation by a Member State of economic activities having cross-border aspects 
which take place within the’ EU ‘is not always comparable to that of economic activities 
involving relations between Member States and third countries.’83  As the legal context in the 
UK is likely to remain comparable to that of the EU, and if the UK maintains cooperation 
with EU tax authorities, the presumption would be rebutted in the case of the UK post-Brexit. 
 
Justifications distinct to third countries under Articles 64, 66 and 75 TFEU 
 
As we recall that Article 63 TFEU extends to third countries, we also note that Article 63 
TFEU has direct effect as regards third country investors.84  UK investors will fall into a third 
country situation when the UK leaves the EU, unless the UK joins any of the alternatives to 
EU membership options or agrees a ‘unique model’ with the EU.  The question is whether 
third country situations are treated the same way as intra-EU situations.  The case law on 
third countries is characterised by caution, as the Court is not seeking to apply the full force 
of its intra-EU jurisprudence.85  It is argued by Catherine Barnard that free movement of 
capital between Member States and third countries is more limited than the provisions of 
Article 63 would at first suggest.86  While Article 63 TFEU applies free movement of capital 
to third countries, the derogations applicable against third countries may limit the extent to 
which a third country can enjoy the benefit of EU economic market by way of free movement 
of capital. 
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To the extent that most concerns that arise in third country situations would not apply to the 
UK after Brexit, the UK would still enjoy full benefit of Article 63 TFEU.  One concern with 
unrestricted third country participation by way of direct foreign investment is the lack of 
plain playing field between Member States and third countries.  Investment infrastructure, 
including favourable public security in some third countries, may not be the same as is in the 
Member State.  Reciprocity of investment between third countries and Member States may 
remain unlevelled given different infrastructure.  And ‘the preconditions (functioning market 
economy, implementation of the acquis, and compliance with basic principles and values of 
the Union) for far-going liberalisation may not be met in the third country context.’87  It is 
argued that these concerns would not apply to the UK after Brexit.  We turn to consider four 
distinct restrictions that Member States may potentially apply against the UK after Brexit. 
 
First, the restriction contained in Article 64(1) TFEU would not apply to the UK post-Brexit.  
This allows any restriction that existed before 31 December 199388 to remain between 
Member States and third countries in respect of the movement of capital to or from third 
countries involving direct investment.  Article 64(1) TFEU is interpreted by the Court to 
presuppose that the legal provision relating to the restriction in question have formed part of 
the legal order of the Member State concerned continuously since 31 December 1993.89  
Moreover, the Court has stated that any national measure adopted after 31 December 1993 is 
not, by that fact alone, automatically excluded from the derogation laid down in Article 64(1) 
TFEU – a provision which is, in substance, identical to the previous legislation, and will be 
covered by the derogation.90  However, the condition in Article 64(1) TFEU concerning 
restrictions is not satisfied where national provisions adopted after 31 December 1993 are 
based on an approach which differs from that of the previous law and establishes new 
procedures.91 
 
Second, long-lasting restrictions that EU institutions may impose on third countries – it is 
argued that these are unlikely to be imposed on the UK post-Brexit unless it is deemed that 
participation of the UK hinders the proper functioning of the internal market.  ‘The EU, taken 
as a whole, is the UK’s major trading partner, accounting for 44% of exports and 53% of 
imports of goods and services in 2015.’92  As ‘the UK imports more from the EU than it 
exports to it,’93 thereby enhancing rather than hindering the proper functioning of the internal 
market, the EU is unlikely to impose long-lasting restrictions on the UK.  Nonetheless, one 
such restriction is contained in Article 64(2) TFEU.  This allows the Parliament and Council 
to adopt measures restricting third countries’ capital movement.  The Council, consulting the 
Parliament, ‘may unanimously’ adopt further restrictive measures affecting third countries 
under Article 64(3) TFEU.  The Council and the Commission may adopt further restrictive 
measures affecting third countries under Article 65(4) TFEU.  All these restrictive measures 
fall in the category of long-lasting measures that the EU institutions may impose.  As long as 
the legal context in the UK remains comparable to that of the EU, with the UK maintaining 
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cooperation with EU authorities, and the UK having favourable conditions for EU investors, 
EU institutions may not justify imposing long-lasting restrictions on the UK post-Brexit. 
 
Third, the restriction contained in Article 66 TFEU.  The Council may impose restrictive 
measures for up to six months where, in exceptional circumstances, movement of capital to 
or from third countries cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of the 
economic and monetary union.  As long as the UK continues with financial policies that meet 
EU laws, it is unlikely that capital to or from the UK post-Brexit would cause a threat to the 
EU financial stability to justify measures under Article 66 TFEU.  As the nature of measures 
taken under Article 66 TFEU tends to be confined to measures seeking to safeguard tax 
revenue,94 targeting third countries that provide offshore tax havens,95 it is unlikely that such 
measures would be applicable to the UK as to restrict capital to or from the UK post-Brexit. 
 
Fourth, the restriction contained in Article 75 TFEU – given its primary focus on fighting 
terrorism, with the UK leading on data systems of fighting terrorism in the EU,96 it is unlikely 
to be used against the UK’s interest post-Brexit.  The Article allows the Parliament and 
Council to impose administrative restrictions such as freezing of funds ‘belonging to, or 
owned by or held by, natural or legal persons, groups or non-state entities.’  Article 75 TFEU 
draws on Articles 60 and 301 TEC, stipulating power to impose anti-terrorist financial 
sanctions.  This now removes the difficulties identified in Kadi v Council, that is, the 
difficulties that Articles 60 TEC and 301 TEC did not provide for any express or implied 
powers of action to impose measures on addressees in no way linked to the governing regime 
of a third country.97  The UK complements rather than hinders the efforts of the EU in the 
fight against terrorism. 
 
In general terms, it would appear that where the restriction negatively affects the ability of 
residents of Member States investing in third countries, the Court is cautious.  In Skatteverket 
v A,98 Germany and Netherlands unsuccessfully argued that drawing from case law to apply 
direct effect of Article 63 TFEU in favour of third countries ‘would unilaterally open up the 
market to third countries without retaining the means of negotiation necessary to achieve 
liberalisation on the part of those countries.’  The Court was concerned with the effect the 
Swedish law has on investors residing in Sweden seeking to invest in third countries.  The 
Court observed that ‘the effect of such legislation is to discourage taxpayers residing in 
Sweden from investing their capital in companies established outside the EEA.’  As such, the 
Court found that the Swedish law entailed ‘a restriction of the movement of capital between 
Member States and third countries which, in principle, is prohibited by Article’ 63(1).  For 
extending the scope of protection to third-country investment in Article 63 TFEU, Heike 
Schweitzer argues that this was meant to ‘signal Europe’s firm commitment to an open 
investment environment to the world and was based on the conviction that a free inflow of 
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capital would benefit the EU area even if granted unilaterally.’99  It is in this regard that the 
UK, post-Brexit, is likely to continue enjoying free movement of capital as before Brexit. 
 
6. How free is the free movement of capital post-Brexit? 
 
How free is the free movement of capital likely to be for the UK post-Brexit?  While 
avoiding speculation, this question can be answered, albeit briefly, with a reasonable degree 
of certainty.  There are four scenarios as to how free the free movement is likely to be for the 
UK post-Brexit.  (i) There would be movements of capital from EU Member States to Brexit 
UK.  EU Member States would be bound by Article 63 TFEU.  Legally, Brexit UK would not 
be bound by Article 63 TFEU, as it only prohibits Member States from restricting capital to 
or from third countries, but it may not be in the Brexit UK’s interest to restrict capital inflow.  
But Brexit UK could legally complain against Member States for any unjustified restriction.  
(ii) There would be movements of capital from Brexit UK to EU Member States.  EU 
Member States would be bound by Article 63 TFEU, unless derogations apply.  (iii) There 
would be movements of capital from third countries to Brexit UK.  This would not be 
covered by Article 63 TFEU.  (iv) There would be movements of capital from Brexit UK to 
third countries.  This too would not be covered by Article 63 TFEU.  So far in this article, it 
is scenarios (i) and (ii) that have been discussed, which fall in the scope of Article 63 TFEU, 
and would in that sense allow the UK to have ‘à la carte’ access to the EU’s single market. 
 
As to scenarios (iii) and (iv) above, Article 63 TFEU does not apply.  The UK will need to 
negotiate investment deals with non-EU countries, unless the competence is retained by the 
EU under any post-Brexit arrangement between the EU and the UK.  Where competence to 
negotiate investment deals with non-EU countries reverts to the UK, with regards to capital 
movement, it will make no difference that Article 63 TFEU is inapplicable, as long as the UK 
does not restrict capital movement to or from non-EU countries.  The effect of Article 63 
TFEU is to prohibit the restriction of capital flows.  If the effect of Article 63 TFEU is 
maintained post-Brexit, between Brexit UK and non-EU countries, capital flow will still not 
be restricted in light of scenarios (iii) and (iv) even though Article 63 TFEU is inapplicable. 
 
For sure there are factors that may negatively affect the flow of capital into the UK that are 
not caught by Article 63 TFEU or/and its derogations.  These may include, for example, if an 
EU or a non-EU company were to relocate from to outside the UK.  For example, companies 
that were located in the UK because of UK’s EU membership may wish to relocate outside 
the UK.  The impact of such factors may not be fully assessed without much speculation.  But 
much level of capital flow could be maintained if the UK maintains the factors that attract 
foreign investors.  These factors include: ‘the UK’s flexible labour market, strong rule of law, 
independent judiciary, relatively skilled workforce, political stability, the English language, 
openness of the UK economy, the UK’s relaxed attitude towards foreign ownership of 
assets.’100  After Brexit, if EU or non-EU investors find conditions in the UK to be most 
favourable than in their countries, they are likely to continue investing their capital in the UK. 
 
                                               
99 Heike Schweitzer, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds – Market Investors or “Imperialist Capitalists”? The European 
Response to Direct Investments by Non-EU State-Controlled Entities’ In Bernitz and Ringe (Eds), Company 
Law and Economic Protectionism (OUP, 2010) 271. 
100 Treasury Committee, ‘The economic and financial cost and benefits of the UK’s EU membership’ (House of 
Commons (HC 122), 27 May 2016) paras 206-211. 
The UK Government intends to maintain the legal context comparable to that of the EU after 
the UK exits the EU.  The first major step taken was to pass a law to convert EU law into UK 
law. On 26 June 2018, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 received Royal Assent.  
This will convert existing EU law to UK law, to ensure that the same rules and laws will 
apply after Brexit to provide the maximum possible certainty and continuity to businesses.  
EU/UK rules on the free movement of capital would remain unchanged.  While the EU legal 
framework on the free movement of capital is likely to remain unchanged for the UK post-
Brexit, UK’s overall access to the EU internal market will depend on the UK’s negotiation 
with the EU on other EU freedoms that are not by EU law already extended to third 
countries.  But as post-Brexit UK will be one of the stronger third country economies to 
which Article 63 TFEU guarantees free movement of capital, as a major EU trading partner, 
this should put the post-Brexit UK in a stronger, not weaker, position to negotiate mutually 
favourable deals with the EU on the other EU freedoms. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Contrary to the widespread mantra that EU freedoms are inseparable, this article has shown 
that the free movement of capital applies to third countries without acceptance of the other 
EU freedoms.  The implication of the free movement of capital for the UK post-Brexit has 
been discussed in the light of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
It is clear in the EU case law that Article 63 TFEU guarantees non-restrictive market access 
for the free movement of capital not only to Member States, but also to third countries.  This 
would apply equally to the UK post-Brexit.  To affirm that Article 63 TFEU is primarily 
about market access and not per se about equal treatment, the Court has made it clear that 
breach of Article 63 TFEU does not per se depend on discrimination.  The Court has also 
stated that the requirements of free movement of capital are infringed even when the measure 
applies equally but dissuades investors from other countries or renders that freedom illusory. 
 
Article 63 TFEU unilaterally opens up the internal market to third countries.  This means that 
the UK would continue to enjoy free movement of capital post-Brexit.  Although the general 
derogations in Article 65 TFEU and the additional third-country specific derogations in 
Articles 64, 66 and 75 TFEU potentially limit the extent third countries may participate in the 
internal market, these are unlikely to affect the UK post-Brexit.  One general restriction that 
may remain applicable to the UK post-Brexit is in the field of taxation.  But as the autonomy 
of Member States to apply taxation restrictions applies to both Intra-EU and Extra-EU capital 
movements, it would make no difference to the UK post-Brexit.  Further, as long as the legal 
context in the UK remains comparable to that of the EU and the UK cooperates with EU tax 
authorities, Member States may not justify tax restrictions.  As such, it is argued that after 
Brexit, regardless of the status the UK has in relation to the EU, the UK would continue 
enjoying free movement of capital as before Brexit.  In other words, under EU law on the free 
movement of capital, the UK post-Brexit can have ‘à la carte’ access to the EU’s single 
market. 
